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IESPONDENrs •••••
NATURE OF CASE
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of the
nature of the case.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
Respondent agrees with appellant's disposition of lower cowt.

STATEMENT OF FAC'I'S
Respondent agrees with the statement of f.iacts set
forth by appellant.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THERE WAS EVIDENCE 01<-. WILFUL M!ScON.
DUCT ON TIIE PART OF THE DEFENDANT.

Few Utah decisions have construed the guest statute
of our state, UCA, 1953, Section 41-9-1. "Ordinarily the
matter of wilful misconduct is a jury question unl~ the
facts are such that reasonable minds could not conclude
that the defendant showed that type of intention or know!.
edge or indulged in that type of aggravated negligence n~.
essary to create liability on account of wilful misconduct
in guest passenger cases. See Ricciuti vs. Robinson, 2 U.2d
45, 269 P.2d 282. The Utah Court, however, has defined
what constitutes wilful misconduct in a guest case as recently as September 8, 1960, said definition being as fol·
lows:
"Wilful misconduct is the intentional doing of an ·
act or intentional omitting or failing to do an act, with
knowledge :that serious injury is a probable and not
merely a possible result, or the intentional doing of an
act with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible
consequences."
See Milllpn vs. Harward, et aJ., 11 U.2d 74, 355 P.2d

62.

Substantially, there have been only two fact situations
analyzed by the Utah Court, the one fact situation being
represented by the type of case such as Ricciuti vs. R-Obinson wherein the driver was speeding and inadvertently
dropped a cigarette distracting his attention, and the fact
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siiiiation analyled in the case of Stack vs. Kearnes, 22 P.2d
594. In the Stack vs. Keames case,
"Warren Stack brought an action against Edwin
J. Kearnes to recover damages for personal injuries
allegedly sustained when defendant's automobile, in
which plaintiff was a guest passenger, overturned on
a highway curve. At the first trial the jury returned
d verdict of no cause of action against the plaintiff
and the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a new
trial. After the second trial, the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Allen Crockett, J.,
entered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court, Wolfe, J., held that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in granting a new trial since there was sufficient evidence upon
which the jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of wilful misconduct and that the_ plaintiff had not assumed the risk of defendant's. manner
of driving."
The wilful misconduct that the Court referred to in
the Stack vs. Keames case, 22 P.2d 594, was speed of a~
proximately 55 to 60 miles per hour on the regularly traveled portion of a road when the highway was wet and the
defendant was rounding a curve, the defendant braking as
he rounded said curve, causing the automobile to go out
of control and tum over, injuring the guest.
Plaintiff claims that the defendant's conduct was an
intentional doing of an act with knowledge that serious injury is a probable and not merely a possible result, or the
intentional doing of an act with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences. When Davies intentionally traveled up the shoulder of the road at a place
where the law definitely prohibited driving under all of the

adverse conditions, to-wit: on a slick road, with known ob
stacles, on a dark night, he was certainly flirting with a·JS.
aster. Plaintiff urges that the fact situation so far as ,~ilful misconduct is concerned is substantially greater than
that found in the case of Stack vs. Kea.mes, 22 P.2d 594,
heretofore mentioned.
As heretofore stated, ordinarily the matter of wilful
misconduct is a jury question unless reasonable minds could
not conclude that the defendant showed that type of intention or knowledge or indulged in that type of aggra.
vated negligence neces.sary to create liability on accollllt
of wilful misconduct in a guest passenger case. See Ricci.
uti vs. Robinson, 269 P.2d 282. Certainly it would appea.r
that reasonable minds could conclude that defendant did
show 'that type of intention or knowledge or indulged in
that type of aggravated negligence necessacy to create Jia.
bility on account of wilful misconduct.

Plaintiff now cites other authorities than Utah who
have dealt with the subject of wilful or wanton misconduct
under guest statutes.

1

"Whether particular acts or omissions in operat· ,
ing a motor· vehicle constitute gross negligence, wilful
or wanton misconduct, reckless disregard for the safo·
ty of others, or heedlessness which will penni t recov·
ery under a guest statute or comparable common-law
rule for injuries to or the death of a gratuitous gue:;t
riding therein, depends largely upon the surrounding
circumstances, and every pertinent act or omis~ion e~; ,
tering into the particular accident is to be considered
1

See 8 Am Jur 2d 506, Automobiles and Highway Traf·

fie.

1

''Excessive speed alone does not constiute gross
negligence, wilful or wanton misconduct, disregard of
the saft'ty of others, recklessness, or the like, within
tii:· meaning of a guest statute or comparable comi.:uJl la\'> rule, but is a factor to be considered in detcnnir;ing whether the operator of a motor vehicle
w;1s guilty of such conduct. However, excessive or
iml(l\1·ful s;ieed coupled with other facts, such as driving at high speed through patchs of fog in thick traffic or around a dangerous curve, or without keeping
a propPr lnokout, may be sufficient to establish liability to a gratuitous guest under such a statute or
rule."

See 8 Am .Tur 2d 507, Automobiles and Highway Traffo:: also, o ALR 3rd 769.
,,
A case that has at least two of the elements found in
the Roylauce vs. Davies case which is now being consid-

ered in the Court is Davis vs. Hollowell, 40 N.W. 2d 641.
In the Davis vs. Hollowell case, plaintiff and defendant had
b.oen together during the entire evening and until the following morning at sun up. During that time, they had
both consumed intoxicating liquor. On the way home, d~
fendant, Davis, had driven at approximately 60 miles per
hom on the regularly traveled portion of the road, the
same being a country road with an uneven surface. In
answer to special questions submitted to the jury, the jury
found that defendant Davis, was under the influence of
liquor when she left the party. That defendant, tDavis, did
not lose control of the car solely as a result of the excessive spet'd in loose gravel, that the accident was not caused
solely by excessive speed, and that it was not caused solely
by the intoxication of the driver.
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The Court in that case pointed out that while exc-es.
sive speed alone is not sufficient to establish liability un.
der the guest statute calling for wilful wanton misconduct
nor was merely driving while under the influence of liquo;
itself adequate, both are matters to be considered along
with the other circumstances in determination of a finding
of wilful misconduct.
Another case which restates the proposition that
while speed alone may not be sufficient to constitute wiJ.
ful misconduct, it is a matter to be taken into consideration
with all of the circumstances is the case of Bernard Rodney, Administrator, etc., of Rose St.a.man, D008a.Sed, vs.
Harry H. St.a.man, Executor, etc., of Paul St.a.man ,D~,
May 27, 1952, 371Pa1, 89 A2d 313, 32 ALR 2d 976. The
only evidence concerning the accident was the uncontra·
dieted testimony of a living eye witness, a truck driver,
and some photographs of the scene taken immediately after
the accident. The evidence established that on a rainy
and misty day, the Sta.man car was being driven at a speed
of 75 to 80 miles per hour, down hill, on a wet, brick-top
road twenty feet wide, into a curb at the bottom of the
hill. Preceding the collision for five and one-half miles,
the road had been "awful curvy". The shoulder of the
road was soft. As the Staman oar approached the curve,
its right wheels went off the roadway onto the shoulder.
It immediately came back onto the road at a sharp angle,
crossed over the center line, and crashed into the left front
of the truck in which the driver was slowing down and pul·
ling off of the road toward the right-hand side. The defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to go
to the jury on the question of the driver's wilful wanton
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misconduct on the ground that there is no evidence as to
the driver's state of mind, and that excessive speed alone
is not sufficient evidence of the requisite misconduct.
The Court pointed out as to the driver's state of mind,

"Such a disposition or mental state is shown by a
person, when, notwithstanding his conscious and timely knowledge of an approach to an unusual danger and
of common proba!bility of injury to others, he proceeds
into the presence of the danger, with indifference to
consequences and with absence of all care."
To show the requirement of culpable knowledge on
the part of the driver, the Court points out that it is not
necessary that such knowledge be actual or that it be established subjectively. It is sufficient to show ". . . circumstances tending to disclose that the motorist knows or
should knorw that an injury to his guest will be the probable result of such conduct." The Court further points
out.
"Whether the driver's state of mind be proven subjectively or objectively, the jury tests his conduct by
the standard of care of the reasonable man."
The Court says,
"The excessive spe€d of the driver of the automobile in the instant case takes on material significance
when considered in connection with other attendant
factors such as the sharp curve at the foot of the descending grade, the wet condition of the relatively narrow brick roadway, the presence of the truck deecending the opposite hill to the same curve and the force
with which the Staman car must have crashed into
the truck as evidenced by the photograph. Under
these conditions, it was for the jury to say whether

8

the driver of the Staman car with 'conscious and tirne
ly knowledge of an approach to an unusual danger , ~
of common probability of injury to other ' . • . pro.
un
ceeded into the presence of the danger, with indiffer.
ence to consequences and with absence of all car ,
If he did, then he was guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct under the Ohio Statute."

m:

Plaintiff calls the Court's attention to the fact thai
the jury could have received absoJutely no testimony 11,
this case as to a warning on behalf of the guest that thP
host's conduct was objectionable, because both parties ii~
the automobile were dead. The Rodney vs. Staman case~
similar to the Roylance vs. Davies case now being considered by the Court, because the host driving the automobile on the wrong side of the road under the conditions
heretofore set forth with all orf the obstacles and knowledge on behalf of Davies certainly show wanton misconduct as clearly as if the defendant had said, "Here I go,
regardless of consequences." In the Roylance vs. Davies
case, a very strong case is made out because the driving
was completely proper to the very point where the wilful,
wanton misconduct must begin some place and certfilnly
it should not prejudice the plaintiff's rights in this matter
if it was only seconds before the inflicted injury that the
host engaged in the wilful, wanton miconduct. In the
Roylance vs. Davies case, we even have a stronger stipu·
lation, because it is uncontradicted that the defendant, Stephen Davies, knew of each and every one of the hazardous
conditions and yet willfully traveled from the correct pa!h
into certain peril.
Another case that speaks of speed in connection with
other c:iricumstances is Adam E. Buroker vs. Herbert G.
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Bnnn1, Supreme Court of Indiana, March 9, 1961, 172 N.E.

:..:d 849.

The Court there states:

"We adopt the rule as stated by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Meyer vs. Cully, supra, at page 94 of
'.241 P.2d:

" 'While it is generally true that mere speed of itself does not constitute wilful misconduct yet there
may be a point at which the speed :became so excessive that the danger of injury to a guest was probable
at such extreme speed and that this might constitute
wilful misconduct. Needless to say the circumstances
appearing in each case must rule this point.' "
Also, 237 Ind. at page 608, 145 N.E. 2d at page 902
this Court stated:
"We recognize that 'When one by a continuous
course of conduct seems to exercise no concern for
others he may be both wilful and wanton.' Kahan vs.
Wecksler, 1938, 104 Ind. App. 673, 678, 12 N.E. 2d 998,
1000.

"It is also true that 'acts such as exhibit a conscious indifference to consequences, make a case of
constructive or legal wilfulness.' Bedwell vs. DeBolt,
supra, 1943, 221 Ind. 600, 607, 50 N.E. 2d 875."

W13:0NG SIDE OF ROAD!. 8 Am Jur 2d 517,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic

"Driving om the wrong side of the road does not
necessarily constitute gross negligence, wilful or wanton misconduct, or recklessness, within the meaning
of a guest statute or comparable common law rule, at
least where such improper driving is inadvertent. However, neC>dlessly driving a motor vehicle on the wrong
side of a highway in the face of another motorist ap-
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proaching from the opposite direction and in pl .
vi~, has been held to constitute such misconduct, a~:
will render the owner or operator liable for ini·ur
sustained by a gratuitous guest as a result thereo/~
One of the cases cited for the above text statement~
the case of LeFeve vs. Ascher, Cignoni vs. Same, 198 N.E
251. In the LeFeve vs. Ascher case, the highway was sliµ.
pery, it having snowed during the early morning. As thi
defendant approached a curve on a ten-percent grade, thP
defendant pulled out to pass a truck at a proximate S]lel'ti
of 20 to 25 miles per hour. When the defendant's car was
even with the car he was passing, another car came inte
view from the opposite direction traveling at the proximate
speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour, and a collision OCCllrJ'(lj
resulting in injury.
Massachusetts has a statute,
"Whenever on any way, public or private, there i.1
not an unobstructed view of the road for at least om
hundred yards, the driver of every vehicle shall keep
his vehicle on the right of the middle of the travel~
part of the way, whenever it is safe and practicable
so to do."
In this case, the Court was talking of gross negligenci:
and not wilful misconduct, but again they state the same

thing,

"Whether there had been such gross negligence
must depend chiefly upon the particular circumstance>
of each case. The combination of facts in the case at
bar was the steep grade, the sharp curve, the extremely icy and slippery condition of the surface of a main
highway of travel, the impossibility of seeing aheao
more than 100 feet, the insistence of the defendant m
spite of appropiate warning upon attempting to pa§
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the large truck involving necessity of violation of ·the
law of the road by driving very much to his left of the
center of the road when he had an unobstructed view
of the road only 25 yards, and the difficulty of passing the truck quickly."
These factors alone would not show gros.s negligence.
All of them grouped together warranted the findings of
the jury.

In the case naw being considered by the Court of Roylance vs. Davies, plaintiff contends that defendant's driving on the wrong side of the road was a definite factor
showing wilful misconduct, that is, defendant in order to
sJ.tisfy a whim of his own was willing to ignore the rules
of the road and proceed in an unlawful manner along a
l'.Ourse studded with hazards under adverse conditions. A
steel utility pole on the wrong side of the road and a car
approaching on the wrong side of the road are both hazards
and the resulting effect would differ only in the matter of
force. AB demonstrated in this case, certainly a steel utility pole was sufficient to do considerable damage.

DRIVING WITH VISION OBSCURED, 8 Am JW' 2d 509,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic
8 Am Jur 2d 509, Automobiles and Highway Traffic,
states as follows:
"The manner of operation of a motor vehicle when
the vision of the operator is obscured by smoke, dust,
:ttmospheric conditions, or an unclean windshield, may,
under the circumstances, constitute gross negligence,
wanton or wilful misconduct, recklessness, or heedlessness within the meaning of a guest statute rendering
the owner or operator liable for injuries to a gratuitous
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guest riding therein. For example, driving fast ·
fog, resulting in a collision with a motorist conin
i1ng
from the opposite direction, or with a parked or sta .
.
mg
veh"icle, may render the owner or operator liabt~
for injury to his gratuitous guest under a guest statt
ute. Likewise, the ownei' 01· cp2.rator of a meter \f.
hicle may be held liable for injuries sustained by a g10.
tuitous gue;:;t when the vehicle is driven in the rain 01
an unreasonable rate o.f speed under the circumstan.
ces, and runs or skids oH the road. Similarly, the
manne1r in which one drives when. mist oh.::wi 23 h~
vision, or through a snowstorm, er when he i~ unab!1
to see through his windshield becaus2 c.f frost or sll'I'\
may be sufficient to charge the owner or operator with
liability under a guest statute for injuries smtaiillJ
by a gratuitous guest as a result of such conduct. In
most cases, whethe'r, under the circumstances, the
manner of operation of a motor vehicle with vision ob.
sured constitutes such misconduct as will rrndEr the
Ol\VIler or operator thereof liable for injuries sustainej
by a gratuitous guest, is a question for the jury."
Returning now to the fact situation in the Roylance
vs. Davies case, at the time the accident occurred, it 11as
snowing and dark. Plaintiff contends that this is just one
more factor coupled with all of the o"!:her factors that sho11>
wilful misconduct.
The case of Childs, et al. vs. Radzevich, 139 F.2d 374
interprets a District of Columbia guest statute which provides that no person transported as a guest by the owner
of a motor vehicle shall be entitled to recover damagei
for injuries resulting from its operation, "unless such death
or injury was caused or resulted from the gross negligenl'e
or wilful and wanton disregard of the safety of the person
* * "" being so transported cm the part of such owner

-. " The facts roughly in that case are that the defpndant at a proximate speed of 50 miles per hour failed
hE"E'd a stop sign and traveled from a dirt gravel road
10
011 to a macadamized portion of the road which was slippery as a result of the rainfall and skidded, striking a utility pole.

The Court, in that case, points out that this is a fact
situation that should be submitted to the jury. Similar to
the case that is now being considered by the Court, to-wit:
Roylance vs. Davies, whether or not the stop sign was
there had no bearing whatsoever upon the end result because the automobile was proceeding at a certain speed
from one surface of the road onto another surface of the
road and did not involve cars traversing the intersected
highway, which is another illustration of the violation of
the law of the road being merely one other evidence of the
wilful misconduct and in the case of Roylance vs. Davies,
being on the wrong side of the road.
Another case that has a somewhat similar element
to the Roylance vs. Davies case is the case of Miller w.
Erickson, et al., 76 F.2d 599. In that case, the defendant's
conduct consisted of driving at night in a thick snowstorm
at a speed of at least 25 miles per hour and colliding with
a parked car properly lighted. The Vermont guest statute called for ~ negligence which was defined according to their law as the defendant conducting himself with
utter recklessess of the safety of others, which is not
greatly different from the Utah definition of wilful misconduct. Judgment was rendered against the defendant
and the Court said,
''The judgment against Erickson appears to us jus-
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tified. H e was driving a motorcar at a spaict t,
0
least twenty-five miles an hour through a vill '.,
· ht ·
h'
age,,
rug m a t ick snowstorm, when by his own stat~
ment he could not see ahead more than sixty or .
enty feet."
sei

Attention is called to the point that in the Roylant(
vs. IDavies case, that although Davies knew the PoSt Wac
there, he did not even see it.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY.
If Roylance was injured when Davies ran into the tel~
phone pole, and the same is established by the eviden~
properly admitted in this case, plaintiff contends that the
only proximate cause of the injury to Duane Roylance WI!!
Stephen Davies' conduct. See Hillyard vs. Utah By-hducts Company, 263 P.2d 287.

POINT ill
THE CONDUCT COMPLAINED OF BY PLAIN·
TII<-Y, THAT IS, DRIVING NORTH ALONG THE
SHOULDER OF A ROAD RESERVID FOR SOUTR
BOUND TRAFFIC WAS ONE FACTOR IN SHOWING
WILFUL MISCONDUCT OF TIIE DEFENDANT, AND
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURID
WAS THE WILFUL MISCONDUCT OF DEFENDANT
AS DEFINED BY THE COURT.
Plaintiff's theory in this matter is that it is wilful misconduct on behalf of the defendant which plaintiff com,

1~

of and the said wilful misconduct was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries. This is the theory upon which
the t.:ase was presented to the jury and upon which plaintiff relies. See Instruction No. 2 given by the Court in
the Roylance vs. !Davies case. It is the plaintiff's contention that the driving on the wrong side of the road is a
pli:1ti!S

circumstance that plaintiff had a right to show

to prove

by independent evidence the defendant's wilful misconduct.

POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE AS A MA'ITER OF LAW DID
NOT SHOW THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF
RISK
The Court instructed the jury on the theory of assumpton of risk and contributory negligence. The instructions took the usual form and the jury found against the
defendant on these theories. Plaintiff contends that
whether or not there was contributory negligence or assumption of risk was a jury question.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC
TIONS TO THE JURY.

Instruction No. 2 informed the jury of both plaintiff's
and defendant's theories of the action as plead by the parties. Instruction No. 4 further defined what the burden
of proof was as to the respective parties. Instruction No.
5 sets out the Utah Traffic Law as it was applicable to the
roadway in question. UCA, 1953, Section 41-6-68:10.
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Instruction Nos. 2 and 4 are in the usual stanctai
form Which is supplemented adequately by later definitior.
As to Instruction No. 5, certainly the plaintiff should ~
allowed to prove the actual rule of the road where the OJ!
lision occurred since the action is based upon wilful llti:
conduct and the violation of this rule of the road was ot
factor to show wilful misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Ordinarly the matter of wilful misconduct is a juJ,
question unless reasonable minds could not conclude th::
the defendant showed that type of intention or knowledi'
or _indulged in that type of aggravated negligence necessar:
to create liability on account of wilful misconduct in a gu~
~ger case.
The lower court properly instructed fr,:
jury as to wilful misconduct and the definition thereof. Thi
jury unanimously rendered a correct verdict.
Defendant's wilful misconduct was the proximate ca~
af plaintiff's injuries.
The verdict· should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY H. IVIE, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff an~
Respondent
48 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah

